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A model explaining physician supply in the United
States from 1953 to 1973" was postulated and estimated.
Factors affecting the supply of foreign and domestic
physicians were examined separately. Several aspects
of medical school capacity and physicians' income were
also developed, and recent trends in medical education and
the training and licensing of physicians were examined.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the All Volunteer Force has had a
significant impact on the projected ability of the military
services to recruit and retain physicians in numbers suf-
ficient to operate the military health care delivery
system at its historical level. Thus more attention
must and is being given to the quantification of those
elements which affect the flow of new physicians into
active practice in the United States. This is a necessary
first step in constructing a model which would assist the
services with their particular physician problem. !
Pierce Johnson, after reviewing the literature and
examining the historical production of physicians since
1910, prepared a model to explain physician supply [Ref. 1]
.
Using Johnson's work as a basis, a more refined model
was developed and estimated using data from 1950 to 1973.
Focusing on the monetary aspects of students' decisions
to enter the field of medicine, a series of equations was
estimated that explains the yearly production of domestic
physicians. In addition, a set of structural equations
was formulated, but not estimated, which might describe the
economic factors influencing a medical student in his choice
of a specialty.
^his research is a portion of a project being funded by
Systems Analysis Division, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, examining physician supply.

The elements which determine the flow c£ foreign
trained physicians into the United States health care
delivery system were examined and modeled. Finally, the
existence of barriers which prevent foreign physicians
from practicing in this country was addressed.

II. THE MODEL
The supply of physicians entering the medical profession
in a given year (or accessions in year t) comes from two
sources; they may either be graduates of domestic or foreign
medical schools. In equation form, accessions are defined









where FMGL represents foreign-trained physicians licensed
for practice in the U.S. in year t and DMGL is their domes-
tic counterpart. Their respective paths entering the system
are quite different, and must therefore be considered
separately.
A foreign medical graduate (FMG) desiring to practice
medicine in the United States faces certain obstacles before
he may apply for licensure. He must first pass the Education
Council on Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) examination.
The annual failure rate in this examination is high, and
greatly restricts the number of foreign physicians eligible
to seek licensure in the U.S. Yet the financial benefits
of becoming a licensed physician in this country are
substantial
.
In the present model, the number of foreign medical
graduates who have applied for but not yet passed the ECFMG
exam will be designated by the variable POOL, inasmuch as
10

they literally represent a pool of potential licensed
physicians available to this country. POOL is assumed
to be a function of the net median income of a U.S. phy-
sician (INCOME) , and the historical probability of
successfully passing the ECFMG exam (PASS) . This relation
can be represented in general form by:
POOL,. = f (INCOME^ ,PAS3^ ) 2 (2)
Once a member of the POOL has successfully completed
the ECFMG exam, he is eligible to seek licensure in the
state in which he desires to practice. However, requirements
for the licensure of foreign medical graduates vary greatly
from state to state. Since a substantial portion of these
doctors never become licensed physicians, the number of
foreign medical graduates actually licensed to practice in




t _ x )
(3)
2 In this and in all subsequent equations, the subscripts
represent time in increments of one year. Given that time t
is the year being examined, a subscript of t-x is the value
of that variable x years earlier, reflecting a delay (or a
"lag") of x years before the impact of a change in the inde-
pendent variable (in this case INCOME) would be reflected in
the dependent variable (POOL, for instance). This period is
normally interpreted as a delay in the flow of information,
or the period of time that passes before this information
becomes a basis for decision. The exact value of these time




The number of domestic medical school graduates can be
modeled in more detail. A student who has completed four
years of college may apply to medical school. Undoubtedly
many of these applicants are motivated by highly personal
or idealistic goals, and would seek to become physicians
at almost any income level. Nonetheless
,
^most applicants
may be presumed to be influenced, to a significant extent,
by the previously discussed variable INCOME, and the amount
of federal scholarships and loans available to medical
students (FSL) . Thus the number of applicants can be
described by the equation:
APPLICANTS^ = h (INCOME,. ,FSL + ) (4)t v t-x ' t-x y
.
*
It is necessary to note that medical schools in this
country have been operating at capacity for the time period
covered by this model. 3 In their annual report on medical
education, the Journal of the American Medical Association
has used identical figures for "enrolled students" and
"capacity" since 1950. The question then becomes, "What
affects capacity?"
Previous studies have claimed that the capacity of
medical schools is dictated by the American Medical
Association in accordance with their own self-interest,
3 For purposes of this model "capacity" will refer only
to the capacity for first-year enrollment, and not the total
capacity of the school.
12

and perhaps this is so. 1* This model is not structured to
examine this hypothesis directly. Identifying (and quanti-
fying) this type of influence would be extremely difficult,
and would require a separate analysis. But other factors
presumably exist which should- exert substantial influence
on the decision to expand or reduce capacity. Certain
federal legislative incentives (FLI) to increase capacity
may well have had an effect. 5 The demand for increased
capacity, as reflected by applicants, should also be signifi-
cant. Certainly if it can be demonstrated that these
factors exerted only a nominal influence on the overall
capacity, such results would be consistent with the hypo-
thesis -that a strong external constraint to limit the growth
of medical schools does exist. Whether or not this con-
straint might have been imposed by the AMA would, of course,
not. be discernable within this model.
We will examine the following relationship between
capacity, applicants, and legislative incentives:
CAP. = m (APPLICANTS. V ,FLI. J (5)
T. t — X X. — X
''Self-interest in the sense that a shortage in physician
supply in the U.S. drives up the price for physician services,
manufacturing artificially high salaries for the member
physicians. For an examination of these studies, see
Reference 1.
5 State legislative incentives might be even more sig-
nificant, particularly for state institutions, but modeling
this would require an examination of the capacity of each of
the medical schools individually, an effort far beyond the
scope of this research.
13

The number of students actually graduating from medical
school (GS) will be defined as the number of students
entering medical school minus an attrition factor. Studies
have shown that the principal cause of attrition among
medical school students has been academic failure, followed
by a loss of desire to become a doctor. Lack of financial
support appeared to be rarely a- problem [Ref. 2]. It will
be assumed that the percentage of entering students graduat-
ing four years later is a constant factor k. Moreover,
since capacity is identical to the number of entering
students, we can define GS to be:
GS
t
= k * CAP
t _ 4 (6)
It should be noted that graduating from a domestic
medical school does not imply automatic licensure. Each
graduate must complete a specified period of residency
before he is eligible for licensure, the time required
being dependent on the particular medical specialty he
desires to enter.
In previous years, this period was separated into a
one-year generalized "internship," with a subsequent two
or more years of specialized "residency." But the current
trend in medical education is for graduates to go directly
from medical school into residencies, with internships
being completely phased out in the near future. 6 In
e See discussion in Chanter III.
14

this model periods of internship and residency will be
combined under the term "residency."
Attrition during this period has not been examined in
the literature, but it appears that almost all domestic
medical school graduates are licensed at some time subse-
quent to graduation. In fact, the American Medical
Association, in its annual Distribution of Physicians in
the United States has included interns and residents as
a part of the total physician strength of the United States
Thus the equation for the licensure of a domestic medical
graduate will not be examined in detail, but rather pre-
sumed to be a mechanical relationship represented by the
equation:
DMGL,. = n * GS^
,
< n < 1 (7)
t t-x v
The formal model is now complete, inasmuch as the sum of
DMGL and FMGL is the annual accessions to the medical pro-
fession, as discussed in equation (1). But A can also be
defined as the summation of physicians entering each of the
medical specialties. 7 Consider the equation:
6
A^ = I EP.
1 (la)
L i = l
L
7 For this equation, the corresponding values for i will
be 1 - General Practice; 2 - Internal Medicine; 3 - General




What factors influence a young physician in this
decision process? One might be the opportunity cost (OC )
in choosing specialty i instead of specialty j , where j
represents the specialty having the greatest financial
return. Given the nature of this market, the job oppor-
tunity (JO) or the need for more specialists of type i
might also have an effect. This is the case because the
availability of residencies within a field and the oppor-
tunities to practice in that field after licensure would
probably influence the individual's decision. Thus the





fi K-x.> j°t- x .) m
• 1
with OC determined by the difference in median incomest-x
i
in year t-x- , and JO defined as the percentage of
residencies filled in specialty i in year t-x. , the interval
x. varying according to specialty.
16

III. THE DOMESTIC PHYSICIAN
While the foreign trained physician represents the
short-run supply response (see Chapter IV) to changes in
needs or demands for physicians, the model postulates the
domestically trained physician as the long-run supply response
That is, the number of physicians that can be produced
(trained) at any given point in time is constrained by the
capacity of United States medical schools at that time. In
order to increase this capacity, existing facilities must
be expanded or new facilities constructed. Qualified
personnel must be found to administer and teach in these
facilities. After the initial decision to expand, construc-
tion takes the majority of the time before new facilities
can be put into use. Moreover, even if construction were
instantaneous, it would still require a minimum of three
years for any student to successfully complete his education
in the new facility. 6
Upon completion of medical school, the graduates are
not yet able to practice. They must be licensed by one of
the individual states or the national licensing board. This
requires passing a written examination and completion of a
year of internship/residency. The minimum amount of time
8A medical school education would normally take four
years. However, under the Health Manpower Training Act of
1971, special incentives are provided to reduce the length
of training, and a significant number of three-year graduates
are now being produced.
17

from the opening of a new medical school until its first
graduates become licensed physicians available to practice
is thus a minimum of four years.
A. FACTORS AFFECTING CAPACITY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS
During the period examined there has been a surplus
of applicants for medical school (see Table 1) . It appears
that the binding constraint is not the lack of qualified
applicants
.
While perhaps a decade ago medical school administrators
had. argued that the number of qualified applicants was
insufficient to justify any substantial expansion, this is
»
certainly not true today. The academic profile of the
rejected applicant has improved considerably. Pressure to
accept students of minority groups has resulted in appli-
cants who would probably have been considered unqualified
being accepted, and their subsequent satisfactory performance
and graduation is a strong indication that the large number
of better qualified non-minority applicants rejected by
medical schools could reasonably be expected to support
any expansion. Only in those state-supported medical
schools that are required to accept a set quota of resident
applicants could the availability of applicants be a real
constraint [Ref . 17]
.
Instead, the capacity of existing medical schools
appears to be the binding constraint, and for the purposes




MEDICAL SCHOOL ACCEPTANCE RATES
1950-1972
Academic Year Applicants Acceptances Acceptance Rate
1950-51 22,279 7,254 32.6
1951-52 19,920 7,663 38.5
1952-53 16,763 7,778 46.4
1953-54 14,768 7,756 52.8
1954-55 14,538 7,878 54.2
1955-56 14,937 7,969 53.4
1956-57 15,917 8,263 51.9
1957-58 15,791 8,302 52.6
1958-59 15,170 8,366 55.1
1959-60 14,952 8,512 56.9
1960-61 14,397 8,560 5 9.9
1961-62 14,381 8,682 60.4
1962-63 15,847 8,959 56.5
1965-64 17,668 9,063 51.3
1964-65 19,168 9,043 47.2
1965-66 18,703 9,012 48.2
1966-67 18,250 9,123 50.0
1967-68 18,724 9,702 51.8
1968-69 21,117 10,092 47.8
1969-70 24,465 10,514 43.0
1970-71 24,987 11,500 46.0
1971-72 29,172 12,335 42.3
1972-73 36,135 13,757 38.1
Source: Reference 3, page 909.
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are operating at full capacity. Rather than defining
capacity as the total enrollment in medical schools, it is




It is at this point in the system that increases (or
decreases) will first become noticeable.
1 . Applicants
The number of applicants applying for medical
school in a given year represent the pressure of those
outside the medical profession desiring entry. It is
assumed that this pressure is not considered relevant for
capacity decisions if it is transitory. As a consequence
the model has been designed to evaluate the effect of
applicant pressure over an extended period of time. To
reflect this pressure for expansion, the model uses the
sum of applicants over the last three years under the
variable name CANTS3 , where
t
CANTS3 = £ APPLICANTS.
i=t-2 1
2. Federal Incentives for Increasing First Year
Enrollments
The variable FLI represents the total federal
obligations to medical schools in the area of undergraduate
medical education, including loans, scholarships , operating
funds, and construction funds for teaching and research
20

facilities. The first legislation to make a substantive
impact in this area was the Health Professions Educational
Assistance Act (HPEA) of 1963, and the resultant contribu-
tions to medical education showed a marked increase begin-
ning in 1965 and continuing to the present (see Appendix A,
Table XII). As a consequence, two variables were used,
with MINFLI representing the relatively minor obligations
from 1950 to 1964, and MAJFLI representing the increasing
obligations from 1965 to the present.
This division enables one to distinguish between
generalized federal funding, offered to a wide variety of
educational institutions which happened to encompass medical
schools, and the concentrated efforts of the federal govern-
ment to stimulate the growth and development of schools of
medicine
.
These efforts have been substantial [Ref . 4] . The
HPEA offered federal financing for up to two- thirds of all
new construction or renovation done with the intent of
increasing the capacity of a school of medicine, and initiated
a program of scholarships for medical students. In 1965 it
was amended to implement the scholarship proposals, and
included an authorization to provide federal support for
operating costs and such improvements as were necessary to
strengthen the accreditation status of schools having diffi-
culty in this area.
In 1968, the Health Manpower Act extended the
provisions of the HPEA Act, and established the Bureau of
21

Health Professions Education to administer the Physician
Augmentation Program, a program designed to increase first-
year enrollments (defined as CAPACITY by the model) by 1,000
students by 1970 [Ref . 5] . The award of any basic improve-
ment grants was predicated upon an enrollment increase of
at least five students, or 2.51 of the first-year class if
the enrollment already exceeded 200 students. This act
also established the priorities of increased enrollment,
financial distress, curriculum improvement, and reduced
period of training.
In 1971, the Comprehensive Health Manpower Training
ACT (CHMTA) shifted the emphasis to a program of "first-
dollar" capitation grants, providing $6,000 per graduate
to any school increasing its initial enrollment by 10
students (or 51, if enrollment exceeded 200 students).
Scholarships were incorporated into the Federal Guaranteed
Student Loan Program, and these funds were now distributed
among the schools on the basis of the number of enrolled
students from low-income families rather than total enroll-
ment, an attempt to stimulate minority selection. To
encourage a shortened period of education, additional awards
were provided for each student graduating in three years,
or completing a combined six-year program of pre-med and
medical school. A separate source of funds was established
for schools of medicine opening after 18 November 1971,
with a sliding scale from $10,000 initially to $2,500 at
the end of the third year for each student enrolled in the
22

school. The federal share of financing construction was
increased to 80% for new schools or major expansions of
existing schools, and 70% for all other.
The increased funding due to this major effort can
be observed in Appendix A, Table X, and the effect of these
funds as shown by the elasticity is discussed in the next
section. While other pressures may have encouraged expan-
sion to some extent, the magnitude of the increase in the
late 1960's contrasts sharply with the growth in prior
years. Perhaps the most telling fact is the major jump
in the 1972-73 enrollment figure. At a time when the 1968
act had already brought about substantial expansion, and
the 1971 act gave no credit for previous expansion in
determining eligibility for capitation grants, every eligible
medical school has met the expansion requirements to partic-
ipate in the capitation grant program [Ref . 4]
.
3 . Estimated Behavioral Relationship s
The stochastic form of structural equation (4) is:
CAP = $ 51
+ 6 52





where CAP is the capacity as previously defined, CANTS3 is
the sum of the last three years' applicants, MINFLI , is
the minor federal obligations in millions of dollars
lagged by one year, MAJFLI , is the major federal obligation




The particular lags selected are based on
approximations of the response time to various incentives
offered. While minor funding normally took the form of
direct support loans or grants, major funding influenced
both immediate increased enrollment and long-term construc-
tion of expanded physical plants, requiring a substantial
lag to incorporate both facets of this effect.
The coefficients to be estimated are represented
by the Greek letter 3. 9 The disturbance term, y, is a
random variable and the following classical assumptions
concerning the disturbance term and the data were made:
E(iO = 6 (1)
E(yy T ) = a 2 I (2)
X is a fixed matrix. (3)
X has a rank k. 10
Prior to discussing this question in further detail
the implications of assumption (2) regarding the disturbance
term, y, must be examined. In relation to time series data,
it implies serial independence for the disturbance terms.
That is covariance of y and Mt+ i is equal to zero. When
9 In the subscripts of the coefficients the first element
refers to the number of the equation. The second element
refers to the order in which the independent variables
appear in a specific equation.
10 X is the matrix of observed values of the independent
variable. k is the number of independent variables.
24

dealing with a time series that is increasing this may not
always be true. It is a distinct possibility that the dis
turbance terms (u *s) follow the first-order regressive
scheme
:
M t MM t-l t

















=0 p f (3)
If this is the case, first-order positive auto-
correlation is said to be present in the data and should
be taken into account and generalized least squares rather
than ordinary least squares used to estimate the coefficients.
If this is not done the sampling variances of the regression
coefficients would be seriously underestimated resulting in
inefficient predictions by the model. 11 Underestimation of
the variance of the coefficient will also result in larger
t statistics and the possibility that an independent variable
will be included in the regression that should not be [Ref. 6]
1
1
Inefficient in this sense means the prediction of the
model would have variances which would be larger than those




Durbin and Watson developed a statistic, known as
the Durbin-Watson "d" statistic, which is useful in testing
for autocorrelation when the sample size is small [Ref . 7]
.
The d statistic is:
n
a = S=2





where e is the calculated residual, t the time period and
n the number of observations. Unfortunately the sampling
distribution of d depends on the observed values of the
independent variables so it was only possible for Durbin
and Watson to establish upper (d ) and lower (d
1
) limits
for the significance levels of d.
In order to determine whether positive autocorrela-
tion was present, the following hypotheses were tested:
HQ





, u t+1 )
> t = 1,..., n
The Durbin-Watson test statistic, d, was used. If d was
greater than the upper limit, d , for the given significance
level, H could not be rejected at that level. If d was less
than the lower limit, d, , H could be rejected but if d
falls between d-. and d the test is inconclusive.
Ordinary least squares was first used to estimate
the coefficients in equation (S) . The Durbin-Watson statistic,
26

d, was less than d
]L
(see Appendix C) indicating that first-
order positive autocorrelation was present in the data.
Generalized least squares was then used to re-estimate 8,.,,
S 52 , 6 53 , and 6 54<
The Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique was used to
estimate the first-order serial coefficient, p, of the dis-
turbances. This technique uses ordinary least squares to
form an initial value for rho . The following iteration
then takes place:




t _ 1 ).
(2) Regression is performed on the transformed
data.
(3) The regression coefficients are
multiplied into the original dependent variables to
recalculate the serially correlated areas.
(4) A new estimate of rho is formed.
(5) When rho changes by less than .005 from
one iteration to the next, the process stops and regression
output is produced [Ref . 8]
.
Data transformed in this manner adheres to assumption
(2) and ordinary least squares may be used.
The resultant form of equation (5) was:
27

CAP. =4328. 07+0. 085CANTS3+27
. 99MINFLI +8.64MAJFLI „ 12t t-1 t-^
R 2 =.9856
(693.95) (0.013) (19.19) (2.86)
[6.23] [6.31] [1.45] [3.01]
The Durbin-Watson test for this equation did not reject
IT 1 3H
o*
Students' t-test (see Appendix B) indicated that
this coefficient of MINFLI . was not significant above the
ninety per cent level while the remaining coefficients were
significant at. the ninety-nine per cent level.
The elasticity of the dependent variable with respect
to the individual independent variable was calculated at the
mean of both variables and the most recent observation




50 while E CAP CANTS3
=
,56, The elaS "
ticity of capacity with respect to MAJFLI ? was calculated
12 The term in parentheses is the standard error of the
estimated coefficient, while the term in brackets is the
computed t-statistic of the coefficient. The term at the
end of the equation is the adjusted coefficient of multiple
correlation, R 2 . This format will be followed in all of
the estimated equations.
1 3Appendix C tabulates the results of the Durbin-Watson
tests for the estimated equations
.
lk l£ the relationship is linear, y=a+3X, the elasticity
e, is given by the formula: e = $— . In the model the
y >^ /
gis the point estimate of the coefficient. X is an observed
value of the independent variable and y is the corresponding
observed value of the dependent variable.
28

to be .04 at the mean values and .12 for e»cademic year
1972-73. It would appear that while federal monies are
having their impact, the primary motivation to expand is
resulting from the press of applicants clamoring for admis-
sion into the select society of the licensed physician. 15
A useful summary statistic which measures the pro-
portion of the total variance of the dependent variable
accounted for by the linear relation fitted is the coeffi-
cient of multiple correlation (R 2 ) . This statistic,
adjusted for degrees of freedom (R 2 ) , for equation (5) is
.9856. Almost the entire sample variance of the dependent
variable, CAP , was "explained" by the hypothesized linear
fit.
B. FACTORS AFFECTING THE NUMBER OF APPLICANTS TO MEDICAL
SCHOOL
Because the number of applicants in previous years
has an effect on the capacity of medical schools, it should
prove useful to examine just what factors determine the
number of applicants in any given year. Certainly the
reasons a college student applies to medical school are
numerous and complex (e.g., prestige, humanitarianism,
income, aptitudes, family tradition, etc.). However, all
15 The elasticity of MINFLI was calculated at the mean of
both variables and in 1964, the final year with observed values
for this variable. The results were .0067 and .0073, indi-
cating that minor spending by the federal government has
little if any effect on the capacity of medical schools.
The results of the t-tests which require a lower level of




of these factors cannot be examined here, and it is proposed
that the income of a physician and the scholarship and loan
funds available to the student to finance a medical education
affect a sizeable portion of the students. These factors
can be evaluated with the same regression techniques used
in the previous equation.
1 . Income 1
6
A great deal of difficulty was experienced in
obtaining consistent income data for physicians in the
United States. Due to the lack of Internal Revenue Service
data and any consistent data from other government sources,
the authors were forced to use median income data as
published by Medical Economics in its new annual survey. 17
Unfortunately this survey only became annual in 1962. Prior
to that it was published every three or four years. In
order to avoid the potential problem of missing observations
in the income time series, a linear growth rate was assumed.
The missing observations were replaced with the interpolated
figures
.
In recent years there has been a trend away from
self-employment toward incorporation by physicians on the
ie See Appendix H for a more detailed discussion of
problems involved in the selection of a valid indicator
for income.
1 7 As reported to the authors during a telephone conversa-
tion with IRS statistician Jack Blackssin (202-964-6111) on
14 January 1975 the only income data available was aggregate
billions reported by doctors' offices. This data has only
been kept since 1958 which includes a gap in 1961 when the
accounting procedures were changed.
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higher end of the income scale. Presumably the primary-
motivation for this is to escape some income taxes and to
benefit from the more liberal corporate pension plan laws.
The constructed indicator of income attempted to compen-
sate for this phenomenon.
The final variable for income consists of net median
earnings for all self-employed physicians up to 1969. 18 ' 19
From 1969 to 1973 net median earnings were used for only those
self-employed physicians practicing in partnership. Since
partnerships tended to earn more than solo practitioners or
the median for all physicians, it was hoped that this would
compensate for the shift of those physicians with higher
incomes to incorporation. 20
2 . Federal Scholarships and Loans
All of the federal legislation discussed in the
section on medical school capacity included substantial
contributions to the loan and scholarship funds of the
various schools. While the available loans and scholarships
18 In constructing the income variable the lower salaries
a physician can expect to earn while serving as an intern or
resident were not considered. Also not considered were the
lower expected salaries an immigrant might face if he were
not licensed. These factors were excluded because the model
includes only those FMG's who become licensed.
19 Net in this case is defined as income from practice
minus top-deductible professional expenses but before income
taxes
.
20 Due to the lack of median income data for those physi-
cians who are incorporated, it was not possible to construct

















are not derived exclusively from federal funds, the major
increases and adjustments in this area have been brought
about by federal policy and the contribution of the govern-
ment will be used as a measure of the trends in this area.
The Health Professions Education Act of 1963,
as amended in 1965, authorized the government to provide
901 of the funds for student loans, with the remainder to
be provided by the school. A ceiling of $2,000 per student
per year was intially established, with repayments over a
ten-year period beginning three years after graduation, at
an interest rate of 3%. The amendment increased the maximum
to $2,500 per year for both loans and scholarships, and
established a program of loan forgiveness, with up to 50%
of the laon forgiven at the rate of 10% per year for a
physician practicing in an area listed by the government
as being short of physicians. Total forgiveness of the
loan was authorized if the physician established practice
in a low- income rural area.
The Health Manpower Act of 1968 did little to
change this program, but the Comprehensive Health Manpower
Training Act of 1971 raised the ceiling on scholarships and
loans to $3,500, with loan forgiveness of 851 for a physician




The extent to which this program has grown is
somewhat evidenced by these statistics: In 1972-73, 23,561
of the 47,546 students enrolled in medical school (49.5%)
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applied for financial aid, and 22.770 (48.8% of enrolled
students) received it. The average loan or grant was
$2,171 [Ref. 3]
.
3. Estimated Behavioral Rel ationships
Equation (4) of the model examines the effects of
nominal income and the federal student loans and scholarships.
The stochastic form of this equation is
APPLICANTS
t
= 3 + 6 42
(INCOME) 2 + B 43 (FSL)
21 ' 22 (4)
where FSL represents the amount of federal funds available
for loans and scholarships (in millions of dollars) , and
INCOME is net median income in thousands of dollars. The •
estimated form of equation (4) is:





The sign of the coefficient of FSL is indeed puzzling. It
indicates that an income in scholarship and loan funds made
by the federal government will result in fewer applicants.
The elasticity calculated for 1972-73 is -0.17 indicating
an increase of ten per cent in federal funds would have
resulted in a 1.7% decrease in the number of applicants,
21 Note should be taken that this relationship is not
linear, as the variable INCOME is squared.
22 For ease of computation the variable INCOME was given
in thousands of dollars.
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Although the principle of maximum correlation tends
to select this formulation as the correct specification,
the test conducted using the t statistic would reject the
hypothesis, at the ninety-five per cent level, that this
coefficient is different from zero. Since there appeared
to be no obvious explanation for the apparent negative
effect of federal monies, equation (4) was also specified
without variable FSL. The respecified equation is:
APPLICANTS = 7384.99 + 10.95 (INCOME ) 2 R 2 = .9660 (4a)
(2760.10) (1.25)
[2.67] [8.72]
The R 2 for this equation is less (.0079) than for the
initial specification but either accounts for almost the
entire sample variance of the dependent variable. 23
The Burbin-Watson statistic, d, falls in the region
where the test is inconclusive for both equations (4) and
(4a). After using generalized least squares, d still
23 The equation was re-estimated using data from the
years 1965-1973 which omitted those years for which the value
of FSL was zero. The resultant equation was:





This equation is consistent with previous findings, and




remained in the inconclusive range. The estimated forms
of both (4) and (4a) were arrived at using generalized
least squares. The elasticity of applicants with respect
to income calculated to 1.07 at the mean and 1.58 for the
1972-73 observations.
C. THE PRODUCTION OF A DOMESTIC PHYSICIAN
Producing a licensed physician from a student enrolling
in medical school is a complex process. Not only must a
student successfully complete his medical school education,
but he must also satisfy the additional requirements of
internship/residency. Finally, he must take and pass a
licensure examination before he is allowed to provide any
unsupervised patient care.
1. Medical School Attriti on
It is somewhat surprising that a constant representing
the percentage of entering students that become physicians is
not readily available. Every year the Journal of the
American Medical Associat ion publishes precise figures on
entering students and graduating students, on applicants
and acceptance rates, carefully sorting out multiple appli-
cations in collecting the data. Statistics on medical
licensure carefully distinguish between licensees that
represent accessions to the profession as opposed to cross-
licensure between various states. Yet the section on
student attrition in the annual report on Medical Education
in the United States is always prefaced by disclaimers
attempting to explain why these numbers are suspect.
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Originally, attrition was defined in this report
as the number of entering students that failed to graduate
four years later. This ignored the possibility that a
student who did not graduate in four years might graduate
in five or six, having dropped out a year or two for reasons
which might be financial, personal, or academic. On the
other hand, a vacancy created by a student leaving school
was frequently filled by a student transferring in from
abroad, through programs such as COTRANS (see Appendix D)
[Ref. 10].
Yet the attrition figure computed seemed to be a
reasonably good estimator, not only because the two
inaccuracies tended to offset each other, but also because
it did in fact present a true picture of how many graduates
could be expected four years later, given a certain student
input, and assuming the continued availability of foreign
trained American students to fill the vacated spaces in
total enrollment. The number of enrolled first-year students
who eventually graduated would be of little value, since
it would convert the availability of the finished product
into a variable with its own probability distribution, com-
plicating any model. But this statistic became useless as
the three-year medical school graduate came into being.
Prior to 1965, only five medical schools offered
the opportunity for a small number of highly qualified
and carefully selected students to complete their education
at an accelerated pace. This was sometimes accomplished
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through merely eliminating vacations from the schedule,
but often involved waiving required courses, or combining
medical school with the pre-med training in a six-year
program [Ref. 11]. But every major piece of federal
legislation offering financial assistance to medical schools,
beginning with the HPEA in 1963, included provisions for
special priorities or increased funding for schools that
shortened the period of education. When the AMA examined
these shortened programs in 1972, 46 of the 106 degree-
granting schools made provision for early graduation [Ref. 3]
In excess of 10% of the students were permitted to graduate
in 36 months or less in 26 schools, 12 of which had better
than 90% of their students in this type of program. 24 To
show the impact of three-year programs, if one attempts to
apply the earlier definition of attrition in the later
period, he soon discovers that, of the 10,401 students
entering medical school in 1969, 10,424 of them graduated
in 1973, producing a negative attrition of 23 students!
But applying that technique to the students entering in
1950 through 1965 and graduating in 1954 through 1969 gives
a constant of .8953, indicating that 10% is a reasonable
estimator of the attrition rate during that period.
In recent years, JAMA has tabled attrition by the
change in total enrollment, determining how many of the
24 One year earlier, before the CIIMTA of 1971 went into
effect, only six schools were in the 90% category.
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students beginning a school year neither graduated nor
enrolled in the succeeding school term, and separating the
attrition rates into year 1, year 2-3, and year 4 in an
attempt to accommodate the three-year programs (see
References 3, 11, 12, and 13). Yet even this number was
modified to indicate that a large number of these students
were not dropping out per se
,
but rather "pursuing advanced
study." As a consequence, the values represented in Table III
as adjusted attrition represent the minimum reportable level
of attrition, while the unadjusted numbers would reflect an
upper bound.
Dealing with so few observations, it is only possible
to guess at what attrition should be. A student entering
a four-year medical program in 1969 would face attrition
rates -of 2.84, 0.62, 1.28, and 0.24 per cent during
four years of school, resulting in a total attrition
rate of 4.98%. As an estimator, this could be biased
downward, because it is taken from the adjusted figures,
or upward, because a large percentage of students entering
in 1969 completed their education in less than four years.
In any case, given the greater selectivity afforded the
medical school selection boards by the greatly increased
number of applicants, it is not unreasonable to assume that
attrition has fallen substantially in recent years, and that
a constant of .95 at least provides a probable survival
rate for medical students during this time. Because the




MEDICAL SCHOOL ATTRITION, 1969-1973
Adjusted Adjusted
Year Enrollment Attrition Attrition Percentage
969-70 1 10,401 304 295 2.84
2/3 18,901 365 79 .42
4 8,367 47 16 .19
37,669 716 390 1.03
1970-71 1 11,348 293 287 2.53
2/3 20,110 403 125 .62
4 9,029 55 9 .10
40,487 751 421 1.04
1971-72 1 12,361 298 270 2.18
2/3 21,677 459 278 1.28
4 9,612 61 36 .37
Source: References 3, 11, 12, 13.
43,650 818 584 1.34
1972-73 1 13,726 307 294 2.14
2/3 23,381 365 251 1.07
4 10,439 46 25 .24







t _ 4 (6)
during the period 1970 to 1973.
2 . Internship, Residency, and Licensure
The requirements imposed by the various states
(the licensing authority) upon a domestic medical school
graduate before he is licensed are not as varied as might
be expected. In almost any state, the requirement is to
complete a minimum of one year of internship and success-
fully pass a licensure examination. Any physician desiring
to enter a medical specialty would undertake a subsequent
period of resident training, but completion of a residency
in no way affects eligibility for licensure.
In 1968, the AMA established a goal of combining
internship and residency into one consolidated period of
training, a policy which is to be in effect for all AMA-
approved residencies by 1 July 1975 [Ref . 12] . Part of the
implementation included a policy that the first year of
residency would be considered equivalent to the internship
for all intents and purposes, including licensure. Thus
one year of subsequent training is the minimum time to
licensure
.
The examination requirement is a passing grade of
75 on each -of the three parts of the Federal Licensure
Examination (FLEX). The student, need not complete the
entire period of training before taking the exam, and need
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not take the three parts all at one time or even in sequence
Part I involves the basic medical sciences, and may be taken
as early as the second year of medical school. Part II
is more specialized, and may be taken during the fourth
year of medical school. Part III is an oral examination
and may be taken only when the first two have been satis-
factorily completed [Ref . 14] . Thus it is quite possible
for a student in his final year of medical school to have
passed all the examination requirements and still not be
licensed for another 18 months, while other students in
the same class might complete a five-year residency before
even attempting the exam. Table IV gives the failure rates
for each part of the examination since 1950.
The number of individuals who graduate from medical
school but fail to meet these additional requirements for
licensure appears to be minimal. While many studies of
attrition in medical school have been reported, no studies
of attrition during residency/internship could be located,
nor are there any intimations of a domestic unlicensed
physician underground, as there was in the foreign graduate
sector. While the failure rates in Part I are by no means
insignificant, it should be noted that several schools
require all students to take Part I while attending school,
and there is no penalty for failure to any student taking
the exam. In reporting the results of testing, the Journal
of the American Medical Association does not break down the




FAILURE RATES FOR FEDERAL
LICENSURE EXAMINATION, 1950-1973
Part I Part II Part III
1950 12.3 1.4 0.9
1951 13.3 1.4 1.7
1952 13.2 0.8 4.3
1953 13.1 2.5 2.9
1954 11.2 2.8 3.8
1955 14.2 1.6 0.6
1956 9.8 1.2 0.6
1957 8.9 0.8 0.6
1958 12.1 2.5 0.6
1959 11.7 2.6 0.4
1960 13.2 2.7 0.3
1961 14.0 1.8 1.4
1962 15.1 3.4 2.0
1963 14.4 2.2 1.9
1964 12.5 1.8 1.9
1965 17.4 1.6 1.5
1966 11.8 2.1 1.9
1967 12.2 2.0 1.5
1968 13.0 2.0 2.0
1969 12.8 1.9 2.1
1970 14.6 1.8 2.3
1971 14.1 2.0 2.0
1972 17.0 2.7 2.2




time and individuals with previous failures (as it does in
reporting the ECFMG results)
,
apparently considering the
distinction to be inconsequential.
The primary difficulty in defining the transition
from student to licensed physician appears to be in identi-
fying the time period involved. Included in the licensure
statistics for each year are medical school graduates of
several previous years, and no break-down of the licensees
is attempted. Consequently the average interval from
graduation to licensure is unobtainable.
The general character of the licensure problem is
thus quite similar to that of student attrition previously
discussed. In that example, given an input in a particular
year, a certain percentage of that number would graduate
four years later, the value of the model by no means
diminished if these graduating students were not all
members of the same entering class four years previous.
Here the same technique was applied, using the ratio of
new licensees to the number of students graduating one
year prior, that being the minimum time to licensure.
Using 21 observations from 1952 through 1972, the
average value of the constant n was .9595, with a standard




= .9595 GS^ (7)
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IV. THE FOREIGN PHYSICIAN
The role of the foreign trained physician is of
increasing importance in the medical care system (see
Table V). In 1950 the number of physicians trained abroad
who were newly licensed to practice medicine in the United
States was 300. By 1970, 3,016 initial licenses were
granted to foreign trained physicians while in 1973, 7,419,
or 44.51 of initial licenses, were issued to foreign trained
physicians. Viewed from another perspective, the supply of
doctors in the United States , as measured by the ratio of
M.D.'s to the population, has increased from 145 per
100,000 in 1950 to 164 per 100,000 in 1970. But without
the immigration of foreign medical graduates this ratio
would have been virtually the same in 1970 as it was in
1950. 25
In the context of a traditional economic model the
foreign physician represents the short-run response to an
increase in demand for physicians. 25 Since it takes a
minimum of four years for an increase in the capacity of
25A11 of the above data are contained in Reference 15.
26 Foreign physicians are defined to include only those of
foreign origin who attended medical school abroad. Thus
American graduates of foreign medical schools and foreigners
who graduate from American medical schools are not considered
in this category. In either case the numbers concerned are
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Source: References 14, 16, 17 and 18.
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medical schools to produce practicing physicians, any increase
in demand will have to be met in the short run by foreign
trained physicians.
In 1957 the Education Council for Foreign Medical
Graduates (ECFMG) came into being. It was created by the
American Hospital Association, American Medical Association,
Association of American Medical Colleges, and the Federation
of State Medical Boards of the United States for the purpose
of dealing with mutual problems relating to foreign resi-
dents and interns. By July of 1961, a certifying examina-
tion was required of all foreign graduates seeking residency
or internship in the United States. The stated purpose
of the examination was to test a candidate's ability to
understand spoken English as well as his professional
knowledge. It was hoped that this screening process would
alleviate some of the existing problems with foreign
residents. The ECFMG examination is currently administered
twice a year in sixty centers located both inside and out-
side the continental United States. After successful
completion of the examination, the foreign medical school
graduate is eligible for acceptance into a training program
in the United States. The issuing of a license to practice
medicine rests with the individual states, each of which
has its own requirements.
Thus the number of foreign trained doctors can be
broken into two separate parts. First those physicians
who have permanent residency status and have been licensed
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to practice medicine in the United States and secondly
those who are in training as interns, residents, and
clinical fellows. It is this first group with which the
model attempts to deal.
The second group was excluded from the model because
of the absence of specific data relating to its membership
In 1963 the Institute of International Education attempted
to identify those foreign interns and residents who were
visitors as distinguished from those who were immigrants
[Ref
. 19] . It was concluded that reliable data concerning
the number of actual immigrants in this group was just not
available because some individuals with Immigrant Visas
were visitors while some with Visitor Visas were potential
immigrants . For example, in 1963 twenty- five per cent of
those foreigners classified as visitors held Permanent
Resident or Visitors Visas while sixty-seven per cent held
Student Visas. Unfortunately similar data for other years
does not seem to exist. This instance does point out the
existence of foreign physicians in the United States who
are long-term or permanent residents who have never
attempted to obtain citizenship and thus are ineligible
to become licensed in the eleven states which require
either United States citizenship or immigrant visas. In
28 other states a posted Declaration of Intent to become
a citizen is a prerequisite which could also exclude this




Although excluded from the model, the contribution of
this second group to the delivery of health care must be
recognized. At the very least, they provide services
during their period of internship and residency prior to
returning to their native lands. In addition, there are
a large number of foreign physicians in this country who
are receiving research training in forms other than intern-
ship and residency. Much of this training is strictly
academic in nature, but some trainees are enrolled in non-
accredited programs which are actually residencies not
labeled as such because of a licensure requirement which
the foreign graduates do not meet.
Prior to 1965, the immigration laws of the United
States which set national quotas for countries outside the
Western Hemisphere could have imposed restrictions on the
incoming flow of foreign physicians. 27 In 1962, these
quotas were relaxed in the case of persons possessing
special education or skills who had made prior application
for Permanent Resident visas. The 1965 amendment repealed
the national quotas and replaced them with preference cate-
gories. Members of the professions and persons of excep-
tional ability in the arts or sciences are in the third
category, following unmarried children of citizens and
27 This presupposes that there existed more physicians




spouses and children of admitted aliens. Although to
practice medicine in the United States the ECFMG examination
must be passed by the FMG , the Department of Labor has
placed foreign physicians who have practiced two years in
their native land in this third category independent of
their ECFMG examination status [Ref
. 21]
.
With the passage of PL 91-225, which amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act in 1970, the requirement
for foreign medical graduates to leave the country upon
completion of their training is discretionary with the
Secretary of State. Those who emigrated from a nation
which the Secretary has determined to require their skills
or whose training program has been financed by their govern-
ment must return to their country of origin for a minimum
two-year waiting period. At the end of this time, they
are eligible to re-apply for entry into the United States.
Those physicians not in this category do not have to leave
the United States upon completion of their training. Thus
there is no constraint whatsoever upon foreign doctors
entering and remaining from a large number of countries.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE VARIABLES
As previously stated, the flow of foreign physicians
to the United States has reached significant proportions
in recent years. The question addressed by the model is
what factors affect the decision of a foreign medical
graduate to emigrate to the United States. Luft suggests
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that the principal decision factors can be grouped into
four major categories [Ref. 21}. These are income, the
quality of professional practice, the conditions of practice,
and the cost of migration. Although Luft suggests methods
of quantifying quality of practice and conditions of practice
such as developing measures of the availability of support
personnel (nurses, paramedics and secretaries) and the
ease of locating in urban areas, this is an extremely
difficult task when dealing with aggregate numbers over
time. This made it necessary to develop surrogates for
the factors affecting physician migration.
1 . The. Pool of Physicians Desiring to Practice in the
United States
Physicians from overseas come to this country for
a wide variety of reasons. There exists at any point in
time a pool of physicians from abroad who have not been
licensed to practice in this country but who are actively
seeking licensure. Rather than attempting to identify
and directly model the changing pattern of physician immi-
gration to this country and developing a quantitative
measure of those factors the following simplifying assump-
tions were made
:
(1) The heterogeneity of non-economic reasons and
changing patterns of immigration of foreign physicians can
be ignored.
(2) This pool of foreign physicians seeking
licensure can be modeled as a function of variables which
will be designated INCOME and PASS.
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Since it is required by most state licensing
authorities that foreign medical graduates (FMG's) pass
the ECFMG examination before applying for internship or
residency programs or for licensure, pool is defined as
the number of foreign physicians in any given year
actively seeking licensure by applying for the ECFMG
examination. This, of course, restricts the examination
to the period since 1958; which was the first year the ECFMG
examination was administered.
The ECFMG examination, which is given twice a year,
may be taken as many times as the individual desires. How-
ever, the fee for the examination is increased from fifteen
dollars for the initial exam to forty-five dollars for sub-
sequent examinations with a final fifty dollars due upon
arrival in the United States or Canada. Our pool can there-
fore be dichotomized into that portion taking the examina-
tion for the first time and that portion who are repeaters
having failed to pass the examination on their first attempt. 2
In order to enter the pool one needs only fifteen
dollars and to remain only forty- five dollars is needed.
One departs the pool when the examination is passed or he
gives up. Due to the high percentage of repeaters taking
the ECFMG examination and the low passing rate, it appears
to be the exception rather than the rule for an individual




to pass the examination on the first attempt. The mean
number of examinations failed by one group prior to taking
the July 1972 exam was 4.4 with a range from one to seven-
teen [Ref . 22] . It is highly probable that the majority
of these applicants had spent a minimum of two years in
the ECFMG "pool" prior to the July 1972 examination.
2
.
The Rate of Successful Completion of the Education
Council for Foreign Medical Gra duates Examination
The variable PASS is defined as the percentage of
those who take the ECFMG examination and successfully com-
plete it in any given year. The purpose of this variable
is to serve as an indication of prospective success to
individuals when entering the pool and when exiting it after
having passed the examination. It must be noted, however,
that this variable also bears a mechanical relationship to
pool in that the higher the pass rate in year t, the
greater the number of applicants who will exit the pool ,
thus, ceteris paribus , leaving fewer to return the next
year.
3. A Potential Income Indicator
There are several possible measures of income that
could be used. It is reasonable to assume that the prospec-
tive immigrant, is concerned not only with the nominal income
he can expect to earn in the United States but. also with the
relative change in standard of living he can expect if he
successfully makes the transition to practicing medicine
in the United States. At this point the difficulties in
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constructing an aggregate model over time must be taken
into account and simplifying assumptions made. Without
knowing the precise distribution of the origin of foreign
physicians and how the actual or potential earning power
of the physicians in their native lands translated into a
standard of living relative to what they could expect in
the United States, a valid income indicator was difficult
to construct. 2 9
The variable INCOME in this equation was the net
median earnings in dollars of self-employed physicians
practicing in the United States. 30 ' 31
B. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF HYPOTHESIZED BEHAVIORAL
RELATIONSHIPS
The model specifies two equations to explain the number
of FMG ' s who were licensed in year t. The general structural
form of these equations is given by equations (2) and (3) in
the model section. The special stochastic forms of these











29 See Appendix H for a more detailed discussion of
problems involved in the selection of a valid indicator
for income
.
30 While income was used in thousands of dollars in equa-
tions (5) and (5a), dollars was the unit used in equation (2)
31 Refer to the discussion on income in Chapter III for





= 3 31+ 3 32 POOL t _ 2+y (3)
FMGL
t
is the number of foreign medical graduates licensed
in year t. INCOME, PASS and POOL are defined as previously
discussed but now the exact lag structure is specified. 32
With data gathered from the years 1958 to 1973, ordinary




Ordinary least squares resulted in the following,
estimation of equation (2)
:
POOL = 5914. 46+0. 908INCOME -257. 81PASS.




The Durbin-Watson test did not indicate the presence
of first-order autocorrelation in the data. Thus it was not
necessary to re-estimate this equation using GLS.
Students' t-test indicates that the coefficients of
both independent variables are significant at the ninety-
nine per cent level (see Appendix B) . If the estimated
coefficient of income were the true value (the point esti-
mate was in fact the actual value) equation (2) would
indicate that a rise of $1,000 (nominal) dollars in net
median income three years ago would result in an additional
32Various models with different lag structures were
examined. The estimated equations with the highest adjusted
coefficient of multiple correlation were chosen to represent




953 FMG's joining the pool this year. The lag of three
years can be interpreted as the time it takes income informa
tion to reach the FMG. Although this appears to be a rather
lengthy interval, it is not unreasonable. When researching
the income data, it was found, for example, that Medical
Economics took approximately 13 months from the end of the
calendar year before publishing their data.
The lag period can also be explained as the result
of the income to be earned in the United States affecting
the decision of the FMG prior to his actual graduation from
medical school. The major point is that potential income
in the United States does have a highly significant effect
on the number of foreign graduates who wish to become
licensed in this country. This is, of course, what one
would expect.
Interpreting the estimated coefficients as the
actual coefficient and examining changes in the dependent
variable due to changes in the independent variables fails
to take into account differing units of measure. If the
estimated coefficients are considered a point estimate, a
better method of analyzing the changes in the dependent
variable is to calculate the elasticities with respect to
the individual independent variables at specific points.
The income elasticities of pool calculated at the mean of
both variables and the most recent observation (1973) were
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1.18 and 1.29 respectively. 33 The elasticities are the
percentage change in the dependent variable brought about
by a one-percentage change in the independent variable. A
ten per cent rise in net median income would result in an
increase of 11.8 per cent FMG ' s joining the pool at that
point in time corresponding to the mean of both variables
but in 1970 the same ten per cent increase would result
in 12.9 per cent new physicians in the pool in 1973.
Similarly the elasticities of POOL with respect to PASS
?
were calculated at the mean of both variables and in 1973.
The corresponding results were -0.44 and -0.23.
The coefficient of PASS is rather puzzling. One
would expect that it would have a positive sign indicating
a behavioral rather than a mechanical effect. A positive
coefficient could have been interpreted as a greater proba-
bility of success encouraging more FMG ' s to join the pool,
ultimately resulting in more licensed foreign graduates in
the United States. The negative sign is the result of the
obvious fact that a higher pass rate two years ago leaves
fewer people returning to the pool for the next two years.
The adjusted coefficient of multiple correlation for
this equation was .9538. That is slightly more than ninety-
five per cent of the sample variance of the dependent varia-
ble, POOL , was explained by the independent variables,
3 3Appendix F tabulates the elasticity calculations for






- , as fitted by the least squares
estimation procedures.
2. Foreign Medical Graduates Licen sed
Ordinary least squares was first used to estimate
the coefficients $_- and 3? ? in equation (3) . The Durbin-
Watson statistic, d, was less than d„ indicating the pres-
ence of first-order positive autocorrelation in the data.
GLS was then used to re-estimate the coefficients. The
resultant form of equation (3) was:




The t-test for significance of the coefficients
indicated that the coefficient of POOL
t _ 2
was significant
at the ninety-nine per cent level while the intercept was
only significant at the ninety-five per cent level.
The positive sign indicated the larger the pool
two years ago, the greater the number of foreign medical
graduates licensed this year. The elasticities of FMGL t
with respect to P00L
t _ 2
calculated at the mean (of the
independent variable) and 1973 values were 2.08 and 1.20,
respectively. Regarding the coefficient as a point esti-
mate, this indicates that a ten per cent increase in
members in the pool in 1971 resulted in twelve per cent
increase in FMG ' s being licensed in 1973.
The lag of two years was supported by McGuinness
in his examination of one group of FMG's in 1972 when he
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found the average applicant took the ECFMG exam four or
more times [Ref . 22] . One would also expect a lag between
POOL and FMGL because not all FMG ' s are licensed immediately
after successfully passing the ECFMG exam. Many of them
serve as interns and residents for varying lengths _of time
prior to becoming licensed.
The negative intercept is most likely the result
of extrapolation beyond the range of the data. 31*
The adjusted coefficient of multiple correlation
for this equation is .854 indicating that over eighty-five





'Dividing the intercept by the coefficient of P00L t _ 2
would locate the point where the regression line
crosses the POOL 7 axis. This could be interpreted
as the
minimum pool size before licensing occurs. This




V. THE MEDICAL SPECIALIST
A. THE VARIABLES
The necessity for insuring that an optimal mix of
medical specialties is achieved at a time when medical man-
power is in short supply has been discussed previously.
A model that could accurately reflect the decision process
of a medical school graduate in choosing a field in which
to specialize after graduation would be of substantial




i K-x.' JOt- x ) • w
recalling that EP is the number of physicians entering
specialty i at time t, OC represents the opportunityt_x
i
cost of selecting specialty i in lieu of another, and JO
"J;L-x
i
represents the job opportunities within that field.
All of the variables included in that model are varia-
bles which had to be developed; none were ever specifically
identified or tabled as such in the literature. Several
approaches were taken in an attempt to produce valid repre-
sentations of these factors, and each was frustrated by
incomplete data, redefinitions of data during collection,
and whole areas which had never been seriously examined.
1 . Entering Physicians
While the number of physicians practicing in the
United States has been reported annually for over fifty
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years, the first attempt to break down the number of physi-
cians by the medical specialty which constituted their
primary activity was not made until 1962, when Congress
first expressed interest in this information. The first
report listed each recognized medical specialty, the total
number of physicians in each field (including interns,
residents and fellows) , the number of interns currently on
duty in the field, and the percentage of residencies filled
in each specialty.
It would appear that the number of licensed physi-
cians entering into each field could be estimated with some
accuracy, given that the number of newly licensed physicians
representing accessions to the profession is known. The
number of licensed physicians at the end of year t should
equal the licensed physicians from year t-1 plus the acces-
sions to the profession in year t minus whatever attrition
(death, retirement) occurred during the period. Of the above,
only attrition is not readily available and 'could be easily
calculated. This attrition can then be assessed against
each specialty, on a weighted or uniform percentage basis,
resulting in a representation of the holdovers in each
specialty from year t-1. Subtracting the specialty
strengths for t-1 adjusted for attrition from the specialty
strengths for year t gives a representation of the specialty
breakdown for the newly licensed physicians in year t.
An attempt to develop the variable EP in this
manner produced several results which could not be reconciled.
6]

During the three-year period from 31 December 1967 to
31 December 1970, the number of physicians in the field of
general practice dropped from 68,920 to 57,948, an attrition
of 10,972 during a period in which calculated attrition for
the entire period was only 5,378! [Ref s . 10, 11].
During the period 1968-1970, an effort was made to
redefine medical specialties, and it might appear that a
large number of general practitioners had simply been re-
classified into another specialty [Ref. 23] . But the logi-
cal directions of this transfer- -pediatrics , obstetrics/
gynecology, or internal medicine- -showed no comparable
increase during this period. The answer must be the
existence of an extensive pattern of lateral mobility
between the various specialties.
One way to deal with this problem might be to
approximate specialty selection by the year-end strength
in each specialty, effectively allowing each physician to
reselect his field of practice. With appropriate time
lags to allow for preparation, opportunity cost and job
opportunity should be significant influences in this model
as well.
But the data is not sufficient to permit such an
effort at this time. Only nine data points are available,
and they are distorted by the redefinition of specialties
in 1968-1970, and the combination of internships and resi-
dencies for reporting purposes in 1965 (resulting in an
apparent net gain in licensed physicians of 10,581 at a
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time when accessions totaled only 9.147) [Ref. 10]. Only
when consistent data has been collected over an extended
period of time would a serious attempt at modeling this
process be rewarding.
2 . Opportunity Cost
The opportunity cost of selecting a medical
specialty with less income potential than another should
be a significant factor in the selection process. But the
development of an estimator of this cost involves more than
just a comparison of median income. The period of additional
training required is an important consideration, and must be
included in the variable. A specialist in pediatric cardi-
ology (a fairly new specialty) is quite high on the income
scale. But the time interval from medical school graduation
until beginning to earn this income is considerable, in-
volving a four- to five-year residency in cardiology fol-
lowed by a two- to three-year fellowship in pediatrics or
pediatric cardiology. Throughout this period of training,
the opportunity cost is considerable, since a resident's
income is less than half the median income for any medical
specialty. Only a weighted average of the opportunity costs
over an extended period could accurately reflect the way
in which this influences the decision. And this cannot be
properly developed until accurate income figures for each
specialty are known.
The difficulties in obtaining an overall median
physician's income have already been discussed, with Medical
6 3

Economics as almost the sole source of information in this
field. Information has been published frequently, if
irregularly, on the median income of physicians in five
major specialties (general practice, general surgery,
internal medicine, pediatrics, and obstetrics/gynecology)
.
This is subject to all of the previous qualifications with
respect to the sample used to generate the data, but it is
the only data available. Average salaries for intern/





3 . Job Opportunity
Perhaps the best figure to use in representing the
need for physicians in a particular specialty would result
from a comparison of the present specialist-to-population
ratio with the specialist-to-population projected as
optimal for the nation's health care. But a determination
of .how many specialists in internal medicine are needed
per 100,000 population, for instance, has as yet not been
calculated by either the federal government or the profes-
sional medical associations.
Attempts have been made in this direction, by
several concerns, however. Mason examined the staffing of
six large prepayment plans, calculating their specialist-to-
membership ratios and presenting them as a basis for esti-
mating national specialty needs [Ref. 24]. This generated
much dissent from the groups. Kaiser Permanente of Portland
claimed that (1) the ratios used reflected several compromises
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with projected ideal ratios, and did not represent Kaiser's
perception of need for specialists, (2) the ideal ratios
were population-specific, tailored to the demographics of
the Portland membership, and as such would be inapplicable
to the nation as a whole, and consequently these figures
would not be released [Ref. 25]. The U.S. Navy recently
published a list of anticipated physician needs by specialty,
but these were also calculated against a particular subset
of the population, and would not be valid in other areas
[Ref. 26].
Some of the individual specialties are examining
this problem through their professional societies. The
American Academy of Family Physicians, for instance, has
projected a ratio of one family practitioner per 2,500
population as a minimum goal, to be re-evaluated as the
specialty approaches it.
If one is willing to assume that the distribution
of medical specialists is responsive to the needs of society,
then the residencies offered in each specialty might be a
valid indication of job opportunity, and the percentage of
fill in each type of residency a reasonable representation
of the students' response. But again there are distortions.
General practice, traditionally the primary care
level of medicine, has reflected a decrease in numbers
every year since 1964. In 1972, only 59% of the available
residencies in general practice were filled, a total of
1,026 residents. But incorporated in the statistics on
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general practice is the new medical specialty of family
practice, created in 1968 to give proper recognition and
prestige to primary care. Of these 1,026 general practice
residents reported above, 919 were family practice types,
filling 86% of all available first-year resident positions
[Ref
. 3] . This distortion will be present until such time
as family practice has grown sufficiently to be listed
as a separate specialty or until general practice is phased
out completely, and makes identification of student response
in this area somewhat difficult. Yet either the response of
students to available residencies or the realignment of
residencies among the various specialties may well prove




The model in its final form consists of the following
equations
:
A«. E FMGL., + DMGL^ (1)
t t t
POOL = 5914.46+0.908 INCOME ,- 257. 81 PASS
t _ 2
(2)




FMGL^ = -2805.17 + 0.287 POOL (3)
t t z - 2 _ g 5 ^2
(1461.89) (0.064)
[1.91] [4.48]
JAPPLICANTS =7802. 93+13. 25(INCOME) 2 -243. 42 FSL (4]
t L L








(693.95) (0.013) (19.19) (2.86) R
2
=.9856
[6.23] [6.31] [1.45] [3.01]








It is of interest to note that there are two economic
variables in this model which are to some extent under the
control of the federal government, and represent potential
0/

policy instruments to generate greater physician flow:
MAJFLI, which is obvious and direct, and INCOME, which while
not expressly determined by the government, can be sub-
stantially affected by federal policy (national health
insurance proposals, for instance).
The length of time required to generate physician supply
is also of interest. Suppose that the income of a physician,
as defined in the model, increased 10% in 1974. This
increase would generate a 15.81 increase in the number of
applicants to medical school in 1974, resulting in pressure
to expand domestic medical school capacity during the years
1975, 1976 and 1977. The resultant increase in the number
of medical students would begin to produce additional
licensed physicians after 1980.
The application of a 10% increase in direct federal
funding of medical schools in 1974 would produce an increase
of almost 21 in capacity by 1977, generating a corresponding
increase in graduates in 1981 and in licensed physicians in
succeeding years.
It should be noted that the federal government has
alternative means of augmenting the flow of physicians,
in that the creation of a federal medical school will
directly increase the supply. Given that graduates of a
federal medical school would be obligated for federal service
upon graduation, whether or not expenditures in this direc-
tion might prove more efficient in increasing the supply of
physicians should be addressed in future research.
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A refined version of this model should investigate the
application of a distributed lag structure in estimating
the effect of variables involving the flow of foreign phy-
sicians to this country. This technique might afford
future users a more accurate representat ion of this aspect
of the model.
Finally, as discussed very early in this paper, the
federal government has at least two major interests in
increasing the flow of new physicians, and hence the stock
of physicians. One is, of course, the concern with insuring
the provision of an adequate number of physicians to support
the population as a whole. The other more specific reason
stems from the need to see that a sufficient, number of
doctors voluntarily choose to serve as military physicians.
It is believed that the present model, expanded to include
a specified and estimated "specialty choice" model, are
necessary components of a model which will predict these
numbers. This topic should be addressed in future research.
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APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND DATA
TABLE VI
NET MEDIAN INCOME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PHYSICIANS
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTY-FIVE, 1950-1973
Year Median Income



























Median Income Adjusted by




























NET MEDIAN INCOME OF PHYSICIANS PRACTICING IN
PARTNERSHIPS UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTY-FIVE, 1969-1975



















1951 5,823 450 6,273
1952 6,316 569 6,885
1953 6,591 685 7,276
1954 7,145 772 7,917
1955 6,830 907 7,737
1956 6,611 852 7,463
1957 6,441 1,014 7,455
1958 6,643 1,166 7,809
1959 6,643 1,626 8,269
1960 6,611 1,419 8,030
1961 6,443 1,580 8,023
1962 6,648 1,357 8,005
1963 6,832 1,451 8,283
1964 6,605 1,306 7,911
1965 7,619 1,528 9,147
1966 7,217 1,634 8,851
1967 7,543 2,081 9,424
1968 7,581 2,185 9,766
1969 7,671 2,307 9,978
19/0 8,016 3,016 11,052
1971 7,943 4,314 12,257
1972 7,815 6,661 14,476
1973 9,270 7,419 16,689




EDUCATION COUNCIL FOR FOREIGN










1958 1,142 1,094 4.2 49.9
1959 4,840 4,47 7 7.5 44.2
1960 14,768 11,301 23.5 39.1
1961 14,222 8,2 04 42.3 37.8
1962 14,535 8,906 38.7 41.7
1963 19,130 11,391 40.5 31.6
1964 18,511 9,378 49.3 36.8
1965 18,337 9,204 49.8 42.7
1966 18,988 10,765 43.3 41.3
1967 19,188 11,777 38.6 46.0
1968 19,548 11,975 38.7 39.8
1969 22,598 12,447 44.9 36.0
1970 29,950 16,651 44.5 39.8
1971 31,033 16,525 46.8 31.2
1972 32,072 1,556 51.5 40.0
1973 37,023 18,964 48.8 33.2





FOR MEDICAL SCHOOL, 1949-1972
School First Year
Year Applicants Acceptances Enrollment
1949-50 24,434 9,150 7,042
1950-51 22,279 7,254 7,173
1951-52 19,920 7,663 7,436
1952-53 16,763 7,778 7,425
1953-54 14,67 8 7,7 56 7,449
1954-55 14,538 7,8 78 7,576
1955-56 14,937 7,969 7,686
1956-57 15,917 8,263 8,014
1957-58 15,791 8,302 8,030
1958-59 15,170 8,366 8,128
1959-60 14,952 8,512 8,173
1960-61 14,397 8,560 8,298
1961-62 14,381 8,682 8,483
1962-63 15,847 8,959 8,642
1963-64 17,668 9,063 8,772
1964-65 19,168 9,043 8,856
1965-66 18,703 9,012 8,759
1966-67 18,250 9,123 8,964
1967-68 18,724 9,702 9,479
1968-69 21,117 10,092 9,863
1969-70 24,465 10,514 10,401
1970-71 24,987 11,500 11,348
1971-72 29,172 12,335 12,361
35




35 This is not a misprint. It appears that in 1971 more




TOTAL MEDICAL SCHOOL CAPACITY, 1949-1972
School Number of Total Graduating
Year Medical Schools Enrollment Students
1949-50 79 25,103 5,553
1950-51 79 26,186 6,136
1951-52 79 27,076 6,080
1952-53 79 27,688 6,668
1953-54 80 28,227 6,861
1954-55 81 28,583 6,977
1955-56 82 28,639 6,845
1956-57 85 29,130 6,796
1957-58 85 29,473 6,861
1958-59 8 5 29,614 6,860
1959-60 8 5 30,084 7,081
1960-61 86 30,228 6,994
1961-62 87 31,078 7,168
1962-63 8 7 31,491 7,264
1963-64 87 32,001 7,336
1964-65 88 32,428 7,409
1965-66 88 32,835 7,574
1966-67 89 33,423 7,743
1967-68 94 34,538 7,943
1968-69 99 35,833 8,059
1969-70 101 37,669 8,367
1970-71 103 40,48 7 8,974
1971-72 108 43,650 9,551
1972-73 112 47,546 10,191
Source
:
References 3 and 23.

TABLE XII
FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS TO UNDERGRADUATE MEDICAL
SCHOOLS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, 1950-1973
Fiscal Loans and Institutional


















1965 6.6 55.7 6 2.3
1966 9.8 6. 6 48.8 65.2
1967 16.0 18. 8 75.3 110.1
1968 18.0 25. 7 91.9 135.6
1969 19.5 40. 9 93.4 153.8
1970 15.7 56. 2 108.7 18 0.6
1971 20.3 77. 97.5 194.8
1972 21.3 140. 4 5.5 167.2





TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF COEFFICIENTS
IN ESTIMATED EQUATIONS
The null hypothesis, H
, that the coefficient is
significantly different from zero was tested against the
alternative hypothesis, H
1 ,
that the coefficient is equal
to zero using the students' t-test. A one-sided t-test
is used. Whether the null hypothesis is 3 • > or 3 - - <
depends on the sign of the estimated coefficient. The
computed t statistic for each coefficient is compared to
the tabled percentile of the t distribution for the given
degrees of freedom. If the tabled value is less than the
computed value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at
the level of significance represented by the tabled per-
centile of the t distribution, a was chosen in order not
to reiect H . if possible, at the 1-oc significance level.j o
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14.38 11 .01 2.718
3., 2.44 11 .20 0.8 7623
















11.209 14 .01 2.624
4.534 14 .01 2.624
2.627 14 .01 2.624
1.91 11 .01 2.718
4.48 11 .05 1.796
4.05 16 .01 2.583
9.10 16 .01 2.583
2.51 16 .05 1.746
2.67 17 .01 2.567
8.71 17 .01 2.567
6.24 12 .01 2.681
6.31 12 .01 2.681
1.45 12 .10 1.356
3.01 12 .01 2.681




TABLED RESULTS OF DURBIN-WATSON TESTS








(1) Do not reject H if d > d
(2) Reject H if d < d .
o £
(3) If dj, < d < d the test is inconclusive.
n = number of observations
k = number of explanatory variables
1-a = significance level
OLS : Ordinary least squares was used to estimate the equation
GLS : The equation was re-estimated using generalized least
squares
.
Equation n k a d
*
d d Results
2-OLS 13 2 .01 0.70 1.82 1.25 CD
2A-0LS 15 1 .01 0.81 2.35 1.07 (1)
2B-0LS 15 3 .01 0.59 2.10 1.46 (1)
3-OLS 14 2 .01 0.70 0.40 1.25 (2)
3-GLS 13 2 .01 0.70 1.91 1.25 (1)
4-OLS 20 3 .01 0.77 0.54 1.41 (2)
4-GLS 19 3 .01 0.74 0.97 1.41 (3)
5
-OLS 17 4 .01 0.57 0.76 1.63 (3)
5





The Coordinated Transfer Application System (COTRANS)
is a cooperative effort of the Association of American
Medical Colleges and the National Board of Medical Examiners.
Its function is to assist United States citizens studying
medicine abroad who wish to transfer from the foreign medical
school to advanced standing in a medical school in this
country. Although COTRANS has only been operational since
1970, its existence has resulted in the successful transfer
of United States citizens from foreign to United States
medical schools. In 1973, fifty- two per cent of those
passing the COTRANS examination were successfully placed
in this country. This is important since it counteracts the
increasing number of citizens initiating their medical
studies abroad which which if pursued to completion and
resulting licensure in the United States are not accounted




INITIAL U.S. LICENSES ISSUED TO AMERICAN

























The pool of FMG's attempting to pass the ECFMG examination
can be divided into two groups. The first group, which will be
called FIRST, consists of those taking the exam for the
first, time. The remainder, which are labeled RESDUE, are
repeaters who failed on their first attempt but remained in
the pool
.
Pool was split into its parts and each part wa« examined
separately. The relationships looked at were:
FIRST
t




+ 3 2R2 INCOME^ + B 2B3 PASS t _ 1 + y (2B)
As with pool, ordinary least squares was used and the
resulting equations tested for autocorrelation. Both
equations were found to be free of autocorrelation. The
equations in estimated form are:




RESDUE = 8763 + 0.401 INCOME^ - 314.29 PASStl (.9542)









Income is a motivating factor to join the -pool and
increased potential income in the future is a primary factor
in keeping initial failures from departing the pool.
The variable PASS , enters the residual equation as
a mechanical rather than behavioral influence. That is, a
lower pass rate produces more RESDUE. After the previous




SELECTED ELASTICITIES OF THE VARIABLES
The coefficient of elasticity, E, is defined to be
percentage changes of the dependent variable divided by the
percentage change of the independent variable.
If the relationship is linear, Y - A + BX, the elasticity
is given by the formula
F = "R _
Y,X Y





F = ?B —L
Y,X Z Y
These formulas were used as required to calculate the
elasticities of the dependent variables with respect to
each independent variable in the estimated equations of the
model. The B is the estimated coefficient while the X and Y
values were taken at the mean and most recent observations.
The results follow.































































38 These observations correspond to the 1964 values which




THE LAG STRUCTURE AND THE
SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL
When considering the initial specification of the model
it was suspected that the effect of some of the independent
variables would not be immediately felt. For this reason
various lags on these variables were investigated. In
choosing among alternative specifications of the set of
independent variables the principle of maximum correlation
was used. The equation with the highest adjusted coeffi-
cient of multiple correlation, R , was chosen to be the
correct specification [31]
.
Not all of the alternative specifications investigated
will be tabulated in this appendix. Equations consisting
of the unlagged variables and the correctly specified
equations have been tabled in this appendix in order to


















































= 8763.05 + 0.401 INCOME - 314.29 PASS , R 2 = .9344
(3335.53) (0.035) (69.318)
[2.62] [11.21] [4.53]


































APPLICANTS = 7802.92 + 13.25 (INCOME,.) 2 - 243.42 FSLu t t
R 2 = .9739
(1925.69) (1.45) (97.13)
[4.05] [9.10] [2.51]
APPLICANTS = 7237.67 + 15.18 (INCOME^^) 2 - 280.27 FSL.,



















CAP = 4328.07 + 0.085 CANTS3 + 27.99 MINFLI^ , + 8.64 MAJFLI,. ,*- t-1 t-3
R2 = .9856
(693.95) (0.013) (19.19) (2.86)
[6.24] [6.31] [1.45] [3.01]
CAP. = 4067.45 + 0.088 CANTS3 + 38.68 MINFLI, +8.46 MAJFLTVt t t-3
- R2 = .9745
(832.29) (0.016) (27.93) (3.159)
[4.88] [5.36] [1.38] [2.67]
CAP^. = 2237.45 + 0.121 CANTS3 + 78.78 MINFLI. , + 2.57 MAJFLI.
t t-1 t
R2 = .9605
(591.08) (0.012) (34.68) (2,43)
[3.78] [9.39] [2.27] [1.05]
CAP,_ = 2440.13 + 0.113 CANTS3 + 95-53 MINFLI. +4.87 MAJFLI.




THE CHOICE OF A VARIABLE TO
REPRESENT PHYSICIANS INCOME
The income of a physician in the United States is cer-
tainly an attractive aspect of the profession. That the
number of people entering the profession will increase as its
financial status improves is axiomatic, all other factors
being equal.
Yet it proved quite difficult to quantify precisely the
real income of a U.S. physician, given the assortment of
single proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations that
exist, and even more difficult to identify the alternative
sources of income that an individual might consider in
making his decision.
For the foreign physician, the financial attractiveness
of practicing medicine in the United States can be represented
in mathmatical terms as:
1)
SUS S l
CPI ITC CPI CUS r
where S.jo is the median salary of a physician in the U.S
in nominal dollars, S
p
is similarly the median salary
(in U.S. dollars) of a physician in a foreign country, and
both are adjusted by the nation's Consumer Price Index,
CPIUS and CPIp.
Yet the development of the variable in this form soon
proved infeasible, given the time frame of the present
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project. As a consequence, it was determined to use nominal
U.S. physician income as an approximation for the true vari-
able. The justification for this decision is as follows:






Examining the rate of change over time for expressions
1-3 gives:
4)
SUS S F \ . SUS


















us/ CPI us CPI
us
2
The error of the two approximations in terms of deviation
from the desired measure (1) can be demonstrated by the dif-
ference between the rates of change. For nominal dollars,
this difference is (4) - (5), which is:
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2
US




SUS Jf_\ d/ SUs\ SF CPI F S F
dt^cPi
us
" cvh) - at\cvi-) • ~^t- - cpi;
The difference in the error between these two terms,




















In times of inflation, CPL, and Snc. will always
be positive in sign and increasing, and CP^tjc will be
greater than or equal to 1. Thus expression (10) must be
nonpositive in value.
If the common terms in expressions (7) and (8) are
positive in value, then the nominal dollar approximation
might be a better estimator, inasmuch as the addition of
nagative terms would tend to bring the value of the approxi
mation closer to the value of the true variable. The
common terms are
:
















This expression is only positive in value for certain
ranges of the variables. For instance, if no inflation
exists then CPI
p
= 1 and CPI
p




the expression reduces to
-S
p , positive only when nominal
foreign salaries are decreasing. If the rate of increase
in the Consumer Price Index exceeds the rate of increase
CPI s
Fin income, i.e., when ^ .__ > q , then the expression
is positively valued. But even when (12) is positive,











since the positive terms would then create an even greater
error in approximating the time variable.
But between these extremes there exists a substantial
range of values for which nominal dollars is the better
proxy for this income relationship. In developing the
variable POOL, both nominal and real income were tested,
and nominal income consistently performed better with res-
2pect to R and t- statistic values. Nominal income was
therefore used as the income variable in the foreign
physicians portion of this study. Analogously, the selection
of an income indicator for use in equation (4) was severely
limited by the lack of available data. Ideally alternative
income that potential physicians might earn in other occu-
pations should be subtracted from physicians income and
deflated by the Consumers Price Index (CPI). This would
yield a difference in real terms which would represent the
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potential gain to a student by choosing the field of medicine.
But the alternative vocations that future physicians might
choose are not clear. In dealing with an aggregate model
the whole range of alternatives cannot be completely specified
The possible alternatives for which data was available were
again real and nominal income. Both of these indicators
were examined analytically in order to determine which would
yield more realistic results. The equations which follow
comprise this analysis. The method is similar to that
used in examining which of these indicators to use in regard
to foreign physicians.
(13) Y_ = PilAI
CPI







Equation (13) is the desired indicator while (14) and (15)
are the available alternatives.
nfi s _d_ rY . _PJ_ kl_ PI CPI AI CPI
1 } dfl 1J "
_CPI CPI (CPI) 2 (CPI) 2
dt I LP1 ( CPI )
Z
(13) A(Y 3 ) = PI
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Equations (16), (17), and (18) are the partial derivatives
of all three indicators with respect to time.
(19) AI CPI AI ALfW± A*K
(CPI )2
CPI CPI l CPI " Ap
(20) AI cpi - -AL + _F_L _ pi cpi _ p-j
(CPI) 2 CPI CPI (CPI) 2
Equation (19) is the difference between equations (16) and
(17) while equation (20) is the difference between (16 and
(18)
(21) D = ^_ PUCPI _ p X = p I(^ 1} PLCP|i^i (cpir (cpi) z
Equation (21) is the difference between equations (19) and
(20). If equation (19) is positive and equation (21) is
negative the analysis would indicate that nominal rather
than real would be the more appropriate income variable.
f221 ALfCPI AT.1<^J CPI L CPI z AI J
If equation (22) is true equation (19) will be positive.
Thus if the percentage change in CPI over time is greater
than the percentage change in alternative income equation
(19) will be positive. Due to the lack of data the conditions
making equation (22) true must be assumed.
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Assuming physicians income is growing with time and that
CPI is increasing with time equation (21) will be negative.
The following equations which compare the results when
estimating equations (2), (2A) , (2B) , and (4) of the model
using both nominal and real income support the hypothesis
that nominal income is the better indicator. In all cases
2









= 5914.46 + 0.908 NOMINAL - 257.81 PASS. - R 2 = .9538
(4969.55) (0.063) (105.33)
[1.19] [14.38] [2.44]
POOL = -3177.22 + 1.44 REAL - 469.74 PASS,. " R2 = .9125u t-J t-2
(7074) (0.143) (139.40)
[0.45] [10.09] [3.37]









POOL. =1.41 REAL,. - - 522.537 PASS^
„
R2 = .9273t t-3 t-2
(0.099) (79.804)
[14.16] [6.54]

















POOL. = -4645.93 + 1.347 REAL,.
-





= 19841.04 + 0.692 NOMINAL
t
- 589.05 PASS R2 = .9137
(7601.73) (0.074) (156.20)
[2.61] [9.29] [3.77]



































































RESDUE = 1461.23 + 0.364 NOMINAL,. , - 83.33 PASS^ R2 = .9195
(3813.95) (0.070) (67.55)
[0.383] [5.17] [1.23]
RESDUE. = -1774.77 + 0.706 REAL,. , - 293.92 PASS,. R 2 = .8199t t-1 t
(6646.87) (0.103) (127.77)
[0.26] [6.84] [2.30]











= 7802.92 + 13 . 25 (NOMINAL^ 2 - 243.42 FSLt





















= -350.31 + 20.01 (REAL
t )
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